Data Noise as Protest: Why Click Pollution Cannot Save Us

Somewhere in the vast data centres that power Meta's advertising empire, an algorithm is learning to paint grandmothers. Not because anyone asked for this, but because the relentless optimisation logic of Advantage Plus, Meta's AI-powered advertising suite, has concluded that elderly women sell menswear. In October 2025, Business Insider documented a cascade of bizarre AI-generated advertisements flooding timelines: shoes attached to grotesquely contorted legs, knives floating against surreal backdrops, and that now-infamous “AI granny” appearing in True Classic's menswear campaigns. Advertisers were bewildered; users were disturbed; and the machines, utterly indifferent to human aesthetics, continued their relentless experimentation.
This spectacle illuminates something profound about the current state of digital advertising: the systems designed to extract maximum value from our attention have become so sophisticated that they are now generating content that humans never created, approved, or even imagined. The question is no longer whether we can resist these systems, but whether resistance itself has become just another data point to be optimised against.
For years, privacy advocates have championed a particular form of digital resistance: obfuscation. The logic is seductively simple. If advertising networks derive their power from profiling users, then corrupting those profiles should undermine the entire apparatus. Feed the machines garbage, and perhaps they will choke on it. Tools like AdNauseam, developed by Helen Nissenbaum and Daniel Howe, embody this philosophy by automatically clicking on every advertisement the browser encounters, drowning genuine interests in a flood of false positives. It is data pollution as protest, noise as a weapon against surveillance.
But here is the uncomfortable question that haunts this strategy: in a world where AI can generate thousands of ad variants overnight, where device fingerprinting operates invisibly at the hardware level, and where retail media networks are constructing entirely new surveillance architectures beyond the reach of browser extensions, does clicking pollution represent genuine resistance or merely a temporary friction that accelerates the industry's innovation toward more invasive methods?
The Economics of Noise
To understand why data pollution matters, one must first appreciate the staggering economics it aims to disrupt. According to the Interactive Advertising Bureau and PwC, internet advertising revenue in the United States reached $258.6 billion in 2024, representing a 14.9% increase year-over-year. Globally, the digital advertising ecosystem generates approximately $600 billion annually, with roughly 42% flowing to Alphabet, 23% to Meta, and 9% to Amazon. For Meta, digital advertising comprises over 95% of worldwide revenue. These are not merely technology companies; they are surveillance enterprises that happen to offer social networking and search as loss leaders for data extraction.
The fundamental business model, which Harvard Business School professor emerita Shoshana Zuboff has termed “surveillance capitalism,” operates on a simple premise: human behaviour can be predicted, and predictions can be sold. In Zuboff's analysis, these companies claim “private human experience as free raw material for translation into behavioural data,” which is then “computed and packaged as prediction products and sold into behavioural futures markets.” The more granular the data, the more valuable the predictions. Every click, scroll, pause, and purchase feeds algorithmic models that bid for your attention in real-time auctions happening billions of times per second.
The precision of this targeting commands substantial premiums. Behavioural targeting can increase click-through rates by 670% compared to untargeted advertising. Advertisers routinely pay two to three times more for behaviourally targeted impressions than for contextual alternatives. This premium depends entirely on the reliability of user profiles; if the data feeding those profiles becomes unreliable, the entire pricing structure becomes suspect.
This is the machine that obfuscation seeks to sabotage. If every user's profile is corrupted with random noise, the targeting becomes meaningless and the predictions worthless. Advertisers paying premium prices for precision would find themselves buying static.
In their 2015 book “Obfuscation: A User's Guide for Privacy and Protest,” Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum articulated the philosophical case: when opting out is impossible and transparency is illusory, deliberately adding ambiguous or misleading information becomes a legitimate form of resistance. Unlike privacy tools that merely hide behaviour, obfuscation makes all behaviour visible but uninterpretable. It is the digital equivalent of a crowd all wearing identical masks.
The concept has deeper roots than many users realise. Before AdNauseam, Nissenbaum and Howe released TrackMeNot in 2006, a browser extension that masked users' search queries by periodically sending unrelated queries to search engines. The tool created a random profile of interests that obfuscated the user's real intentions, making any information the search engine held essentially useless for advertisers. TrackMeNot represented the first generation of this approach: defensive noise designed to corrupt surveillance at its source.
AdNauseam, the browser extension that evolved from this philosophy, does more than block advertisements. It clicks on every ad it hides, sending false positive signals rippling through the advertising ecosystem. The tool is built on uBlock Origin's ad-blocking foundation but adds a layer of active subversion. As the project's documentation states, it aims to “pollute the data gathered by trackers and render their efforts to profile less effective and less profitable.”
In January 2021, MIT Technology Review conducted an experiment in collaboration with Nissenbaum to test whether AdNauseam actually works. Using test accounts on Google Ads and Google AdSense platforms, researchers confirmed that AdNauseam's automatic clicks accumulated genuine expenses for advertiser accounts and generated real revenue for publisher accounts. The experiment deployed both human testers and automated browsers using Selenium, a tool that simulates human browsing behaviour. One automated browser clicked on more than 900 Google ads over seven days. The researchers ultimately received a cheque from Google for $100, proof that the clicks were being counted as legitimate. For now, at least, data pollution has a measurable economic effect.
When the Machine Fights Back
But Google's response to AdNauseam reveals how quickly platform power can neutralise individual resistance. On 1 January 2017, Google banned AdNauseam from the Chrome Web Store, claiming the extension violated the platform's single-purpose policy by simultaneously blocking and hiding advertisements. The stated reason was transparently pretextual; other extensions performing identical functions remained available. AdNauseam had approximately 60,000 users at the time of its removal, making it the first desktop ad-blocking extension banned from Chrome.
When Fast Company questioned the ban, Google denied that AdNauseam's click-simulation functionality triggered the removal. But the AdNauseam team was not fooled. “We can certainly understand why Google would prefer users not to install AdNauseam,” they wrote, “as it directly opposes their core business model.” Google subsequently marked the extension as malware to prevent manual installation, effectively locking users out of a tool designed to resist the very company controlling their browser.
A Google spokesperson confirmed to Fast Company that the company's single-purpose policy was the official reason for the removal, not the automatic clicking. Yet this explanation strained credulity: AdNauseam's purpose, protecting users from surveillance advertising, was singular and clear. The research community at Princeton's Center for Information Technology Policy noted the contradiction, pointing out that Google's stated policy would equally apply to numerous extensions that remained in the store.
This incident illuminates a fundamental asymmetry in the resistance equation. Users depend on platforms to access the tools that challenge those same platforms. Chrome commands approximately 65% of global browser market share, meaning that any extension Google disapproves of is effectively unavailable to the majority of internet users. The resistance runs on infrastructure controlled by the adversary.
Yet AdNauseam continues to function on Firefox, Brave, and other browsers. The MIT Technology Review experiment demonstrated that even in 2021, Google's fraud detection systems were not catching all automated clicks. A Google spokesperson responded that “we detect and filter the vast majority of this automated fake activity” and that drawing conclusions from a small-scale experiment was “not representative of Google's advanced invalid traffic detection methods.” The question is whether this represents a sustainable strategy or merely a temporary exploit that platform companies will eventually close.
The Fingerprint Problem
Even if click pollution were universally adopted, the advertising industry has already developed tracking technologies that operate beneath the layer obfuscation tools can reach. Device fingerprinting, which identifies users based on the unique characteristics of their hardware and software configuration, represents a fundamentally different surveillance architecture than cookies or click behaviour.
Unlike cookies, which can be blocked or deleted, fingerprinting collects information that browsers cannot help revealing: screen resolution, installed fonts, GPU characteristics, time zone settings, language preferences, and dozens of other attributes. According to research from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, these data points can be combined to create identifiers unique to approximately one in 286,777 users. The fingerprint cannot be cleared. It operates silently in the background. And when implemented server-side, it stitches together user sessions across browsers, networks, and private browsing modes.
In February 2025, Google made a decision that alarmed privacy advocates worldwide: it updated its advertising policies to explicitly permit device fingerprinting for advertising purposes. The company that in 2019 had decried fingerprinting as “wrong” was now integrating it into its ecosystem, combining device data with location and demographics to enhance ad targeting. The UK Information Commissioner's Office labelled the move “irresponsible” and harmful to consumers, warning that users would have no meaningful way to opt out.
This shift represents a categorical escalation. Cookie-based tracking, for all its invasiveness, operated through a mechanism users could theoretically control. Fingerprinting extracts identifying information from the very act of connecting to the internet. There is no consent banner because there is no consent to give. Browser extensions cannot block what they cannot see. The very attributes that make your browser functional (its resolution, fonts, and rendering capabilities) become the signature that identifies you across the web.
Apple has taken the hardest line against fingerprinting, declaring it “never allowed” in Safari and aggressively neutralising high-entropy attributes. But Apple's crackdown has produced an unintended consequence: it has made fingerprinting even more valuable on non-Safari platforms. When one door closes, the surveillance economy simply routes through another. Safari represents only about 18% of global browser usage; the remaining 82% operates on platforms where fingerprinting faces fewer restrictions.
The Rise of the Walled Gardens
The cookie versus fingerprinting debate, however consequential, may ultimately prove to be a sideshow. The more fundamental transformation in surveillance advertising is the retreat into walled gardens: closed ecosystems where platform companies control every layer of the data stack and where browser-based resistance tools simply cannot reach.
Consider the structure of Meta's advertising business. Facebook controls not just the social network but Instagram, WhatsApp, and the entire underlying technology stack that enables the buying, targeting, and serving of advertisements. Data collected on one property informs targeting on another. The advertising auction, the user profiles, and the delivery mechanisms all operate within a single corporate entity. There is no third-party data exchange for privacy tools to intercept because there is no third party.
The same logic applies to Google's ecosystem, which spans Search, Gmail, YouTube, Google Play, the Chrome browser, and the Android operating system. Alphabet can construct user profiles from search queries, email content, video watching behaviour, app installations, and location data harvested from mobile devices. The integrated nature of this surveillance makes traditional ad-blocking conceptually irrelevant; the tracking happens upstream of the browser, in backend systems that users never directly access. By 2022, seven out of every ten dollars in online advertising spending flowed to Google, Facebook, or Amazon, leaving all other publishers to compete for the remaining 29%.
But the most significant development in walled-garden surveillance is the explosive growth of retail media networks. According to industry research, global retail media advertising spending exceeded $150 billion in 2024 and is projected to reach $179.5 billion by the end of 2025, outpacing traditional digital channels like display advertising and even paid search. This represents annual growth exceeding 30%, the most significant shift in digital advertising since the rise of social media. Amazon dominates this space with $56 billion in global advertising revenue, representing approximately 77% of the US retail media market.
Retail media represents a fundamentally different surveillance architecture. The data comes not from browsing behaviour or social media engagement but from actual purchases. Amazon knows what you bought, how often you buy it, what products you compared before purchasing, and which price points trigger conversion. This is first-party data of the most intimate kind: direct evidence of consumer behaviour rather than probabilistic inference from clicks and impressions.
Walmart Connect, the retailer's advertising division, generated $4.4 billion in global revenue in fiscal year 2025, growing 27% year-over-year. After acquiring Vizio, the television manufacturer, Walmart added another layer of surveillance: viewing behaviour from millions of smart televisions feeding directly into its advertising targeting systems. The integration of purchase data, browsing behaviour, and now television consumption creates a profile that no browser extension can corrupt because it exists entirely outside the browser.
According to industry research, 75% of advertisers planned to increase retail media investments in 2025, often by reallocating budgets from other channels. The money is following the data, and the data increasingly lives in ecosystems that privacy tools cannot touch.
The Server-Side Shift
For those surveillance operations that still operate through the browser, the advertising industry has developed another countermeasure: server-side tracking. Traditional web analytics and advertising tags execute in the user's browser, where they can be intercepted by extensions like uBlock Origin or AdNauseam. Server-side implementations move this logic to infrastructure controlled by the publisher, bypassing browser-based protections entirely.
The technical mechanism is straightforward. Instead of a user's browser communicating directly with Google Analytics or Facebook's pixel, the communication flows through a server operated by the website owner. This server then forwards the data to advertising platforms, but from the browser's perspective, it appears to be first-party communication with the site itself. Ad blockers, which rely on recognising and blocking known tracking domains, cannot distinguish legitimate site functionality from surveillance infrastructure masquerading as it.
Marketing technology publications have noted the irony: privacy-protective browser features and extensions may ultimately drive the industry toward less transparent tracking methods. As one analyst observed, “ad blockers and tracking prevention mechanisms may ultimately lead to the opposite of what they intended: less transparency about tracking and more stuff done behind the curtain. If stuff is happening server-side, ad blockers have no chance to block reliably across sites.”
Server-side tagging is already mainstream. Google Tag Manager offers dedicated server-side containers, and Adobe Experience Platform provides equivalent functionality for enterprise clients. These solutions help advertisers bypass Safari's Intelligent Tracking Prevention, circumvent ad blockers, and maintain tracking continuity across sessions that would otherwise be broken by privacy tools.
The critical point is that server-side tracking does not solve privacy concerns; it merely moves them beyond users' reach. The same data collection occurs, governed by the same inadequate consent frameworks, but now invisible to the tools users might deploy to resist it.
The Scale of Resistance and Its Limits
Despite the formidable countermeasures arrayed against them, ad-blocking tools have achieved remarkable adoption. As of 2024, over 763 million people actively use ad blockers worldwide, with estimates suggesting that 42.7% of internet users employ some form of ad-blocking software. The Asia-Pacific region leads adoption at 58%, followed by Europe at 39% and North America at 36%. Millennials and Gen Z are the most prolific blockers, with 63% of users aged 18-34 employing ad-blocking software.
These numbers represent genuine economic pressure. Publishers dependent on advertising revenue have implemented detection scripts, subscription appeals, and content gates to recover lost income. The Interactive Advertising Bureau has campaigned against “ad block software” while simultaneously acknowledging that intrusive advertising practices drove users to adopt such tools.
But the distinction between blocking and pollution matters enormously. Most ad blockers simply remove advertisements from the user experience without actively corrupting the underlying data. They represent a withdrawal from the attention economy rather than an attack on it. Users who block ads are often written off by advertisers as lost causes; their data profiles remain intact, merely unprofitable to access.
AdNauseam and similar obfuscation tools aim for something more radical: making user data actively unreliable. If even a modest percentage of users poisoned their profiles with random clicks, the argument goes, the entire precision-targeting edifice would become suspect. Advertisers paying premium CPMs for behavioural targeting would demand discounts. The economic model of surveillance advertising would begin to unravel.
The problem with this theory is scale. With approximately 60,000 users at the time of its Chrome ban, AdNauseam represented a rounding error in the global advertising ecosystem. Even if adoption increased by an order of magnitude, the fraction of corrupted profiles would remain negligible against the billions of users being tracked. Statistical techniques can filter outliers. Machine learning models can detect anomalous clicking patterns. The fraud-detection infrastructure that advertising platforms have built to combat click fraud could likely be adapted to identify and exclude obfuscation tool users.
The Arms Race Dynamic
This brings us to the central paradox of obfuscation as resistance: every successful attack prompts a more sophisticated countermeasure. Click pollution worked in 2021, according to MIT Technology Review's testing. But Google's fraud-detection systems process billions of clicks daily, constantly refining their models to distinguish genuine engagement from artificial signals. The same machine learning capabilities that enable hyper-targeted advertising can be deployed to identify patterns characteristic of automated clicking.
The historical record bears this out. When the first generation of pop-up blockers emerged in the early 2000s, advertisers responded with pop-unders, interstitials, and eventually the programmatic advertising ecosystem that now dominates the web. When users installed the first ad blockers, publishers developed anti-adblock detection and deployed subscription walls. Each countermeasure generated a counter-countermeasure in an escalating spiral that has only expanded the sophistication and invasiveness of advertising technology.
Moreover, the industry's response to browser-based resistance has been to build surveillance architectures that browsers cannot access. Fingerprinting, server-side tracking, retail media networks, and walled-garden ecosystems all represent evolutionary adaptations to the selection pressure of privacy tools. Each successful resistance technique accelerates the development of surveillance methods beyond its reach.
This dynamic resembles nothing so much as an immune response. The surveillance advertising organism is subjected to a pathogen (obfuscation tools), develops antibodies (fingerprinting, server-side tracking), and emerges more resistant than before. Users who deploy these tools may protect themselves temporarily while inadvertently driving the industry toward methods that are harder to resist.
Helen Nissenbaum, in conference presentations on obfuscation, has acknowledged this limitation. The strategy is not meant to overthrow surveillance capitalism single-handedly; it is designed to impose costs, create friction, and buy time for more fundamental reforms. Obfuscation is a tactic for the weak, deployed by those without the power to opt out entirely or the leverage to demand systemic change.
The First-Party Future
If browser-based obfuscation is increasingly circumvented, what happens when users can no longer meaningfully resist? The trajectory is already visible: first-party data collection operating entirely outside the advertising infrastructure that users can circumvent.
Consider the mechanics of a modern retail transaction. A customer uses a loyalty card, pays with a credit card linked to their identity, receives a digital receipt, and perhaps rates the experience through an app. None of this data flows through advertising networks subject to browser extensions. The retailer now possesses a complete record of purchasing behaviour tied to verified identity, infinitely more valuable than the probabilistic profiles assembled from cookie trails.
According to IAB's State of Data 2024 report, nearly 90% of marketers report shifting their personalisation tactics and budget allocation toward first-party and zero-party data in anticipation of privacy changes. Publishers, too, are recognising the value of data they collect directly: in the first quarter of 2025, 71% of publishers identified first-party data as a key source of positive advertising results, up from 64% the previous year. A study by Google and Bain & Company found that companies effectively leveraging first-party data generate 2.9 times more revenue than those that do not.
The irony is acute. Privacy regulations like GDPR and CCPA, combined with browser-based privacy protections, have accelerated the consolidation of surveillance power in the hands of companies that own direct customer relationships. Third-party data brokers, for all their invasiveness, operated in a fragmented ecosystem where power was distributed. The first-party future concentrates that power among a handful of retailers, platforms, and media conglomerates with the scale to amass their own data troves.
When given a choice while surfing in Chrome, 70% of users deny the use of third-party cookies. But this choice means nothing when the data collection happens through logged-in sessions, purchase behaviour, loyalty programmes, and smart devices. The consent frameworks that govern cookie deployment do not apply to first-party data collection, which companies can conduct under far more permissive legal regimes.
Structural Failures and Individual Limits
This analysis suggests a sobering assessment: technical resistance to surveillance advertising, while not futile, is fundamentally limited. Tools like AdNauseam represent a form of individual protest with genuine symbolic value but limited systemic impact. They impose costs at the margin, complicate the surveillance apparatus, and express dissent in a language the machines can register. What they cannot do is dismantle an economic model that commands hundreds of billions of dollars and has reshaped itself around every obstacle users have erected.
The fundamental problem is structural. Advertising networks monetise user attention regardless of consent because attention itself can be captured through countless mechanisms beyond any individual's control. A user might block cookies, poison click data, and deploy a VPN, only to be tracked through their television, their car, their doorbell camera, and their loyalty card. The surveillance apparatus is not a single system to be defeated but an ecology of interlocking systems, each feeding on different data streams.
Shoshana Zuboff's critique of surveillance capitalism emphasises this point. The issue is not that specific technologies are invasive but that an entire economic logic has emerged which treats human experience as raw material for extraction. Technical countermeasures address the tools of surveillance while leaving the incentives intact. As long as attention remains monetisable and data remains valuable, corporations will continue innovating around whatever defences users deploy.
This does not mean technical resistance is worthless. AdNauseam and similar tools serve an educative function, making visible the invisible machinery of surveillance. They provide users with a sense of agency in an otherwise disempowering environment. They impose real costs on an industry that has externalised the costs of its invasiveness onto users. And they demonstrate that consent was never meaningfully given, that users would resist if only the architecture allowed it.
But as a strategy for systemic change, clicking pollution is ultimately a holding action. The battle for digital privacy will not be won in browser extensions but in legislatures, regulatory agencies, and the broader cultural conversation about what kind of digital economy we wish to inhabit.
Regulatory Pressure and Industry Adaptation
The regulatory landscape has shifted substantially, though perhaps not quickly enough to match industry innovation. The California Consumer Privacy Act, amended by the California Privacy Rights Act, saw enforcement begin in February 2024 under the newly established California Privacy Protection Agency. European data protection authorities issued over EUR 2.92 billion in GDPR fines in 2024, with significant penalties targeting advertising technology implementations.
Yet the enforcement actions reveal the limitations of the current regulatory approach. Fines, even substantial ones, are absorbed as a cost of doing business by companies generating tens of billions in quarterly revenue. Meta's record EUR 1.2 billion fine for violating international data transfer guidelines represented less than a single quarter's profit. The regulatory focus on consent frameworks and cookie notices has produced an ecosystem of dark patterns and manufactured consent that satisfies the letter of the law while defeating its purpose.
More fundamentally, privacy regulation has struggled to keep pace with the shift away from cookies toward first-party data and fingerprinting. The consent-based model assumes a discrete moment when data collection begins, a banner to click, a preference to express. Server-side tracking, device fingerprinting, and retail media surveillance operate continuously and invisibly, outside the consent frameworks regulators have constructed.
The regulatory situation in Europe offers somewhat more protection, with the Digital Services Act fully applicable since February 2024 imposing fines of up to 6% of global annual revenue for violations. Over 20 US states have now enacted comprehensive privacy laws, creating a patchwork of compliance obligations that complicates life for advertisers without fundamentally challenging the surveillance business model.
The Protest Value of Polluted Data
Where does this leave the individual user, armed with browser extensions and righteous indignation, facing an ecosystem designed to capture their attention by any means necessary?
Perhaps the most honest answer is that data pollution is more valuable as symbolic protest than practical defence. It is a gesture of refusal, a way of saying “not with my consent” even when consent was never requested. It corrupts the illusion that surveillance is invisible and accepted, that users are content to be tracked because they do not actively object. Every polluted click is a vote against the current arrangement, a small act of sabotage in an economy that depends on our passivity.
But symbolic protest has never been sufficient to dismantle entrenched economic systems. The tobacco industry was not reformed by individuals refusing to smoke; it was regulated into submission through decades of litigation, legislation, and public health campaigning. The financial industry was not chastened by consumers closing bank accounts; it was constrained (however inadequately) by laws enacted after crises made reform unavoidable. Surveillance advertising will not be dismantled by clever browser extensions, no matter how widely adopted.
What technical resistance can do is create space for political action. By demonstrating that users would resist if given the tools, obfuscation makes the case for regulation that would give them more effective options. By imposing costs on advertisers, it creates industry constituencies for privacy-protective alternatives that might reduce those costs. By making surveillance visible and resistable, even partially, it contributes to a cultural shift in which extractive data practices become stigmatised rather than normalised.
The question posed at the outset of this article, whether clicking pollution represents genuine resistance or temporary friction, may therefore be answerable only in retrospect. If the current moment crystallises into structural reform, the obfuscation tools deployed today will be remembered as early salvos in a successful campaign. If the surveillance apparatus adapts and entrenches, they will be remembered as quaint artefacts of a time when resistance still seemed possible.
For now, the machines continue learning. Somewhere in Meta's data centres, an algorithm is analysing the patterns of users who deploy obfuscation tools, learning to identify their fingerprints in the noise. The advertising industry did not build a $600 billion empire by accepting defeat gracefully. Whatever resistance users devise, the response is already under development.
The grandmothers, meanwhile, continue to sell menswear. Nobody asked for this, but the algorithm determined it was optimal. In the strange and unsettling landscape of AI-generated advertising, that may be the only logic that matters.
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Tim Green UK-based Systems Theorist & Independent Technology Writer
Tim explores the intersections of artificial intelligence, decentralised cognition, and posthuman ethics. His work, published at smarterarticles.co.uk, challenges dominant narratives of technological progress while proposing interdisciplinary frameworks for collective intelligence and digital stewardship.
His writing has been featured on Ground News and shared by independent researchers across both academic and technological communities.
ORCID: 0009-0002-0156-9795 Email: tim@smarterarticles.co.uk








